Return-path: Received: from e500.ugi.com [192.168.3.40] by ugi.com; Thu, 15 Apr 2004 22:18:46 -0400 Received: from outgoing2.securityfocus.com(205.206.231.26) by e500.ugi.com via csmap id 65db6850_8f4c_11d8_86c7_003048238bf6_26768; Thu, 15 Apr 2004 22:18:49 -0400 (EDT) Received: from lists2.securityfocus.com (lists2.securityfocus.com [205.206.231.20]) by outgoing.securityfocus.com (Postfix) with QMQP id 20775145DF6; Thu, 15 Apr 2004 23:08:12 -0600 (MDT) Mailing-List: contact bugtraq-help@securityfocus.com; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: Delivered-To: mailing list bugtraq@securityfocus.com Delivered-To: moderator for bugtraq@securityfocus.com Received: (qmail 5647 invoked from network); 15 Apr 2004 10:27:59 -0000 X-Originating-IP: [129.25.36.111] X-Originating-Email: [spiffomatic64@hotmail.com] X-Sender: spiffomatic64@hotmail.com From: "spiffomatic 64" To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com, full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com, vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org Subject: SCT javascript execution vulnerability Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2004 11:36:50 -0500 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; format=flowed Message-ID: X-OriginalArrivalTime: 15 Apr 2004 16:36:51.0190 (UTC) FILETIME=[DA911160:01C42307] Vendor : SCT URL : http://www.sct.com/Education/Products/Connected_Learning/CampusPipeline.html Version : CampusPipeline Risk : javascript execution Description: SCT Campus Pipeline is the Web platform of choice at over 175 institutions. It improves efficiency, builds community, and provides freedom of choice by integrating disparate systems and applications into a unified whole. SCT Campus Pipeline provides an institution’s constituents – students, faculty, administration, and alumni – with centralized Web access to information, services, and communities. Javascript Execution: The email handling portion of this software displays certain attachments such as; html, bmp. Jpg, gif, etc, in the body of the email. It does a noble job of filtering scripting in html files but certain on event handles remain untouched such as: onload(), onmouseover(), onclick(), etc. This is a huge issue seeing as the html page is logged in with the same permissions as the user who views it. The software also uses javascript functions for all of its commands. This allows an hmlt page execute any command such as deletemessage() from . This such instance will delete the email with that html attached to it. When linked to another page with u can execute as much javascript, or any other scripting method as you would like. This hole leads to an attached html having full control over the victims email account just by the victim viewing the email. Because the attacker would have the users session still set, he could potentially execute any command this software uses, such as check grades etc… Solution: The easiest way would be to just disallow previewing of attachments. No other web email service allows this, and for good reason. Another solution would be to filter all onevent handles such as onload(), onmouseover(), onclick(), etc. Credits: Credits goto http://hackthissite.org. It provided a nice, open, legal environment for me to try new things and learn from those who know. A place where you are not reprimanded even if u deface a page or two. A place where I started with no knowledge and in less than a year found new vulnerabilities of my own. Thank you http://hackthissite.org. Lab rats: Ashley, Amy, Nick, Shrinidhi, Charbel and most importantly to Halley, you give me the strength and courage to do all that I do, without you I am nothing. Thank you sweetheart. Exploit: This exemplifies three different onevent handles used:

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; This exploit will delete the current message: This exploit will open a new email message with your desired: Creating a fake session timeout screen with login could also be a problem as shown here: Spiffomatic64 Hacking is an art-form _________________________________________________________________ MSN Toolbar provides one-click access to Hotmail from any Web page – FREE download! http://toolbar.msn.com/go/onm00200413ave/direct/01/