Full Version: Cicso Vulnerability
| QUOTE |
Cisco Personal Assistant User Password Bypass Vulnerability ------------------------------------------------------------------------ SUMMARY Cisco Personal Assistant may permit unauthorized access to user configuration via the web interface. Once access is granted, user preferences and configuration can be manipulated. There is a workaround available and a software upgrade is not required to remove the vulnerability. This issue is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCec87825. DETAILS Affected Products: Cisco Personal Assistant versions 1.4(1) and 1.4(2) only are affected. Cisco Personal Assistant versions 1.3(x) and prior are not affected. No other Cisco products are affected by this vulnerability. To verify the version of Personal Assistant you are running, perform the following steps. 1. Log in to Personal Assistant through the web interface. 2. Browse to Help -> About Cisco Personal Assistant. 3. Click the Details button and a window appears with the full version number. Details: Cisco Personal Assistant is a Microsoft Windows 2000 based application and is part of the AVVID solution. For more information on Personal Assistant, see: <http://www.cisco.com/en/US/partner/products/sw/voicesw/ps2026/index.html> http://www.cisco.com/en/US/partner/product...2026/index.html This vulnerability is only present if both of the following conditions are met: * The Personal Assistant administrator has checked the "Allow Only Cisco CallManager Users" box through System -> Miscellaneous Settings. * The Personal Assistant Corporate Directory settings refer to the same directory service that is used by Cisco CallManager. If both of the above criteria are met, then password authentication to Personal Assistant user configuration is disabled. This allows anyone to enter a valid User ID with any password and the user will be authorized to make configuration changes to that account. The default setting for Personal Assistant is that the "Allow Only Cisco CallManager Users" box is unchecked. Users access Personal Assistant by browsing to the address http://x.x.x.x/pauseradmin where x.x.x.x is the IP address or hostname of the Personal Assistant server. This vulnerability does not affect access to Personal Assistant through the telephony interface. Users access the telephony interface by dialing the Personal Assistant extension. Personal Assistant uses the user's CallManager Extension Mobility PIN or the Unity Subscriber Phone Password to authenticate users through the telephony interface. Impact: This bug permits unauthorized configuration access to users' Personal Assistant settings. This vulnerability does not affect the system configuration of the Personal Assistant application. An attacker can modify the settings of a user, which can include modifying call routing to redirect calls for purposes of impersonation, or forwarding the user's number to a toll number, incurring charges. Software Versions and Fixes: All vulnerabilities listed in this advisory can be removed through configuration of the Personal Assistant server. No software update is required. Obtaining Fixed Software: As the fix for this vulnerability is a configuration change, a software upgrade is not required to address this vulnerability. If you need assistance with the implementation of the fix, or have questions regarding the fix, please contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). Cisco TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac@cisco.com See <http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml> http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Please do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com" for software upgrades. Workarounds: This vulnerability can be removed by de-selecting the checkbox "Allow Only Cisco CallManager Users" on the System -> Miscellaneous Settings page of the Personal Assistant Administration site. This workaround will have no effect on the behavior of the Personal Assistant as CallManager and Personal Assistant must be configured to use the same directory for this vulnerability to be present. Configuring "Allow Only CallManager Users" while having Personal Assistant and CallManager using the same directory is technically redundant. |
=====================================================
from : www.Securiteam.com
i have seen the exploit but i mean what is the use of it?
when do you this command...?
when do you this command...?
This is a "lo-fi" version of our main content. To view the full version with more information, formatting and images, please click here.
