If this not work you can test the connection with tftp or maybe you must have an administrator tool for this cablemodem. I really don't know this software.

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Jun, 11 2002

Summary
Linksys Cable/DSL has been found to contain a security vulnerability that occurs when an administrator flashes (updates
the firmware) the product to the latest version. The vulnerability would allow remote administration even if it has been
specifically disabled in the product (The administration will be available via a different port than the normal
administration port).


Details
Vulnerable systems:
Linksys Cable/DSL version 1.42.7 (BEFSR11 / BEFSR41 / BEFSRU31)

Immune systems:
Linksys Cable/DSL versions prior to 1.42.7 (BEFSR11 / BEFSR41 / BEFSRU31)

After flashing the Linksys Cable/DSL with the new firmware (Version 1.42.7 that was released on May 1 2002), a new port
will open for remote administration, TCP port 5678. This port will open even if the "Block WAN" and
"Remote Admin" are set to disabled.


Additional information
The information has been provided by Tim Mayville

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Linksys Routers Found to be Vulnerable to SNMP Issues ========================================================================== Jan, 14 2002 Summary Linksys DSL routers suffer from serious information leakage problems, as well as a potential opening to be used as a DDoS initiator. Details Vulnerable systems: BEFN2PS4 (EtherFast Cable/DSL Router & Voice with 4-Port Switch) BEFSR81 (EtherFast Cable/DSL Router with 8-Port Switch) (confirmed version 2.37) Immune systems: BEFSR81 version v2.38.1 Querying the mentioned devices with the default community of 'public' causes them to set the address that queried as their snmptrap host, dumping traffic such as the following to that address: Enterprise Specific Trap (1) Uptime: 2 days, 19:00:23.36, enterprises.3955.1.1.0 = "@out 192.168.1.200 ==> 24.254.60.13[110]." Enterprise Specific Trap (1) Uptime: 2 days, 19:00:23.36, enterprises.3955.1.1.0 = "@out 192.168.1.200 ==> 216.120.8.23[5632]." Enterprise Specific Trap (1) Uptime: 2 days, 19:00:23.36, enterprises.3955.1.1.0 = "@out 192.168.1.200 ==> 216.120.8.3[5632]." Enterprise Specific Trap (1) Uptime: 2 days, 19:00:23.36, enterprises.3955.1.1.0 = "@out 192.168.1.200 ==> 216.120.8.4[5632]." Enterprise Specific Trap (1) Uptime: 2 days, 19:00:23.36, enterprises.3955.1.1.0 = "@out 192.168.1.200 ==> 216.120.8.5[5632]." Enterprise Specific Trap (1) Uptime: 2 days, 6:04:38.11, enterprises.3955.1.1.0 = "-->[U]Send OP: ^ps_status_q 15049C0DFC9B03166D55EA30474D04FB 9218583272 a .." Enterprise Specific Trap (1) Uptime: 2 days, 6:04:38.11, enterprises.3955.1.1.0 = "<--[U]Recv __: ^ps_status_r.15049C0DFC9B03166D55EA30474D04FB."".0.." It looks like a combination of debugging information as well as traffic logging; many customers never use the configuration page, let alone change the SNMP communities. To make matters worse, Linksys refuses to distribute an MIB for the device, which is not surprising considering the SNMP implementation on the device is rather broken (it goes into a continuous loop). Further, with the correct community string you could enumerate values, determine the internal network addressing, etc, and even add forwarding rules to access services on internal hosts. When a change is made, the trick is to find the SNMP var that acts as the switch to save the new config values and recycle with the new values. Some poking and some Linksys MIBS found on the Internet id'd/confirmed the software switch as: .1.3.6.1.4.1.3955.3.1.6.0 Integer valued ... set to '1' to save new values/recycle. Additional information The information has been provided by Matthew S. Hallacy and The Cyberiad.