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                          e-matters GmbH
                         www.e-matters.de

                     -= Security  Advisory =-



    Advisory: Trillian remote overflows
Release Date: 2004/02/24
Last Modified: 2004/02/24
      Author: Stefan Esser [s.esser@e-matters.de]

 Application: Trillian 0.71-0.74 w/ patch f
              Trillian Pro 1.0, 2.0, 2.01
    Severity: 2 vulnerabilities were found in the instant
              messenger Trillian that allow remote compromise
        Risk: Critical
Vendor Status: Vendor has fixed and released patches
   Reference: hxxp://security.e-matters.de/advisories/022004.html


Overview:

  Quote from hxxp://www.trillian.cc
 
  "What is Trillian?
 
   Trillian is a skinnable, interoperable instant messaging client.
   Grab the best IM client available on the Internet today!
   Trillian .74 is completely free, with no spyware and no ads.
   Over 10 million downloads can't be wrong!"
   
  While playing around with the recently found Gaim vulnerabilities
  it was discovered that two of them also affect Trillian and allow
  remote compromise.
 
     
Details:
 
  While testing the developed exploits against other instant
  messaging clients it was discovered that Trillian as one of the
  most popular 3rd party instant client for the windows operating
  system is indeed vulnerable to the bugs discovered in the GAIM
  sourcecode
 
  The bugs in question are
 
  [01 - AIM/Oscar DirectIM Integer Overflow]
 
  When Trillian receives a DirectIM packet with a size above 8kb
  it spawns a thread to receive the complete packet. This thread
  allocates a buffer for the incoming packet and one extra byte.
  This procedure suffers from an integer overflow when the size
  is UINT_MAX and will only allocate a buffer of minimum size
  in that case. This buffer is then filled with multiple calls to
  recv() which will result in an arbitrary size heap overflow.

  [02 - Yahoo Packet Parser Overflow]
 
  A Yahoo Messenger packet consist of a header and a list of keys
  with their associated values. When reading an oversized keyname
  a standard stackoverflow can be triggered.
 
  The code below is part of Trillian since version 0.71 which was
  released on the 18th december 2001. It was manually decompiled.
  The variable names were taken from the GAIM source code. If you
  compare the decompiled code with the code in yahoo.c (revision
  1.12 from 15th nov 2001) you will realise that it is more or
  less identical. It is up to the reader to find an explanation
  how this GPL licensed codesnippet ended up in Trillian.
 
 
     int pos = 0;

     while (pos + 1 < len) {

        char key[64], *value = NULL;
        int x = 0, accept;

        struct yahoo *YAHOO = malloc(12);

 while (pos + 1 < len) {
           if (data[pos] == 0xc0 && data[pos + 1] == 0x80)
              break;
           key[x++] = data[pos++];
        }
        key[x] = 0;
        pos += 2;
        YAHOO->key = atoi(key);
        accept = x;

        if (accept) {
           value = malloc(len - pos + 1);
        }

        while (pos + 1 < len) {
           if (data[pos] == 0xc0 && data[pos + 1] == 0x80)
              break;
           if (accept) {
              value[x++] = data[pos++];
           }
        }

        if (accept) {
           value[x] = 0;
        }
        pos += 2;
        if (accept) {
           YAHOO->value = strdup(value);
           free(value);
        }

        return YAHOO;

     }
 
  Finally it has to be mentioned, that it is no longer possible
  to exploit the second vulnerability through the Yahoo! servers.
  It is not known what and why Yahoo! has changed, but they
  do not longer transport unknown keys. We were only able to
  exploit the vulnerability with man in the middle attacks.
  This can be considered good news because this will make it
  impossible to write a widespread worm.
 
  Although Trillian Pro is compiled with the Visual Studio
  stackoverflow protection it is possible to exploit this
  vulnerability by simply overflowing up to the stack top and
  abusing the power of structured exception handlers.
 

Proof of Concept:

  e-matters is not going to release an exploit for any of these
  vulnerabilities to the public.
 

Disclosure Timeline:

  18. February 2004 - Cerulean Studios were contacted over their
                      forum and a mail was sent to the domain
                      owner because mails to security@trillian.org
                      simply bounce back and there is no other way
                      to contact them
  19. February 2004 - Cerulean Studios acknowledged the mail
  20. February 2004 - Cerulean Studios gave us the patches to test
                      Patches were verified and we were notified
                      that they plan to release them on Monday
  23. February 2004 - Nothing happened...
  24. February 2004 - Cerulean Studios have released the patched
                      versions


Recommendation:

  As usual it is recommend to download the update from the Trillian
  homepage at
 
  hxxp://www.trillian.cc
 
  We are not aware of any public exploit for these vulnerabilities,
  but anyone who has developed an exploit for the GAIM vulnerabilities
  could change it easily to work against Trillian, too.
 
 
GPG-Key:

  hxxp://security.e-matters.de/gpg_key.asc
   
  pub  1024D/75E7AAD6 2002-02-26 e-matters GmbH - Securityteam
  Key fingerprint = 43DD 843C FAB9 832A E5AB  CAEB 81F2 8110 75E7 AAD6





DvilleStoner
nice reading, thanks
Paul
Not a big problem if e-matter doesnt release the exploit for public.
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